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Michel de Montaigne
Philosophy as inner struggle
Alexander Roose
Ghent University
The summer of 1572 started in a marvellous mood: a wedding was to reconcile 
Catholics and Protestants, who had been brutally opposing each other since the 
conjuration d’Amboise in 1566. The wedding of the king’s sister, Marguerite, 
and one of the Huguenot leaders, Henri de Navarre brought thousands of 
catholic and protestant noblemen to the court in Paris. The hopes were high, 
but the anxiety remained extremely tangible. On the morning of the 22nd 
of August someone tried to kill the influential, protestant leader Gaspard de 
Coligny. From that moment on, the beast of violence was released. Protestants 
hailed for justice, Catholics feared the protestant reaction and planned a pre-
emptive strike: the protestant elite was to be eliminated. In the night of the 23rd 
of August the tocsin was sounded, and hundreds of protestant noblemen were 
assassinated. The murders and slaughter went on for several days and spread over 
France. Thousands of Protestants were killed. The panic became an émeute, an 
uncontrolled collective loss of control. 
A bit earlier on that year, Michel de Montaigne had left the ‘Parlement de 
Bordeaux’, the court of justice where he served, to work in peace and tranquillity 
in the tower of his domain: he lived a life of leisure, to devote his time to the life 
of the mind, and perhaps to write a book, similar to the Discorsi by Machiavelli 
or the very popular commonplace-books of his time. But this project collapsed as 
he was elaborating it. Montaigne depicted this moment in his essays: 
Recently I retired to my estates, determined to devote myself as far as I could to 
spending what little life I have left quietly and privately; it seemed to me then 
that the greatest favour I could do for my mind was to leave it in total idleness, 
caring for itself, concerned only with itself, calmly thinking of itself. I hoped it 
could do that more easily from then on, since the passage of time had grown 
mature and put on weight. But I find – Variam semper dant otia mentem [Idleness 
always produces fickle changes of mind] – that on the contrary it bolted off like 
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a runaway horse, taking far more trouble over itself than it ever did over anyone 
else; it gives birth to so many chimeras and fantastic monstrosities, one after 
another, without order or fitness, that, so as to contemplate at my ease their 
oddness and their strangeness, I began to keep record of them, hoping in time 
to make my mind ashamed of itself. (I, 8, 31)1
Montaigne became a philosopher, as he had to fight the horrendous hallucinations 
and monstrous thoughts his mind was generating. He started writing down his 
thoughts and representations in order to reflect upon them, to control his mind 
in order to control his emotions and behaviour. His second essay is on sadness. 
Montaigne starts with the story of old about Psammenitus, a King of Egypt. 
Defeated and captured, he had to behold the imprisonment of his daughter 
and the execution of his own son. He did not cry, he remained quiet, while his 
friends were lamenting. ‘But when he saw one of his household friends brought 
in among the captives, he began to beat his head and show grief ’. One could 
assume, Montaigne speculates, that it was the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
But then again, you have to read the whole story: when the king was asked why 
he had remained unmoved by the fate of his children, and had cried when seeing 
his friend dead, he replied: ‘only the last of these misfortunes can be expressed 
by tears, the first two are beyond any means of expression’ (I, 2, 8). Montaigne 
had to process the death of his beloved father and his bosom friend Etienne 
De La Boétie. He had done his utmost to publish the essays that La Boétie had 
written and he was determined to publish his short essay On voluntary slavery,2 
he wanted to place it as a chapter amidst his own Essays. But Protestants were 
using this seditious treatise as a pamphlet to fight the legitimacy of the French 
King. Montaigne abandoned his project and integrated La Boétie’s poems in 
his own book; they formed the 29th chapter of the first edition, and followed 
the famous chapter on friendship. The chapter on Psammenitus might seem 
impersonal and not related to Montaigne’s biography, but it mirrors Montaigne’s 
own unpronounceable sadness. The first chapters of the Essays are Montaigne’s 
search for psychological insight. Montaigne would like to understand his own 
motives and his own emotions. It is not a coincidence that the chapter 18 ‘On 
fear’ starts off with Aeneas’ panic when he is confronted with the ghost of his 
deceased wife: ‘Obstupui, steteruntque comae, et vox faucibus haesit’ (I, 18, 81). ‘I 
stood dumb with fear; my hair stood on end and my voice stuck in my throat’, 
stammers Aeneas. In order to cope with his emotions, Montaigne is working and 
composing his essays. He is writing to ‘toughen and thicken’ (I, 2, 10) his skin. 
1 Montaigne (1991).
2 There are many editions, as e.g. Etienne de la Boétie (1993) and (1997).
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In 1584 the Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius (1507-1606) published a book 
that very rapidly became a bestseller: On constancy in times of public evil, De 
constantia libri duo qui alloquium praecipue continent in publicis malis. It was 
reprinted eighteen times in ten years’ time, and it was translated into French in 
1592.3 Lipsius wrote this book primarily for himself. These were hard times: the 
Spanish occupation, the religious strife and the plague ravaged the Netherlands. 
The library of Lipsius was plundered, and he had enough of the insecurity, the 
clashes of arms, and the intolerance.4 At first, he had wanted to leave the country 
as quickly as possible, but he began to debate for himself whether this was a wise 
decision. Lipsius dedicated his book to the ‘Administrators and the Council and 
the people of Antwerp’. With his writing, he intended to help everyone who had 
to endure the excruciating violence and injustice. Naturally, many sought salvage 
in the Holy Scripture. The Bible was a source of comfort to many. The believer 
drew on the examples of Job and Christ to find wisdom and vigour in order to 
firmly accept his destiny. 
But in times of religious wars, during which the interpretation of the Bible is 
heavily discussed, Lipsius preferred to rely on other texts. He wanted his readers to 
get consolation from philosophy. He hoped readers would derive the strength to 
defy political catastrophes and personal setbacks through philosophical insights. 
And so he hoped that the reader would understand that it was unnecessary and 
even pointless to flee the country and to run away from evil. ‘The mind must be 
changed, not the place; and you should transform yourself into another manner 
of man, not into another place.’5 You have to learn to brace yourself, Lipsius 
reassured the reader. ‘Above all things it befits you to be constant; for by fighting, 
many man has gotten the victory, but none by fleeing’. And what is constancy? 
‘Constancy is a right and immovable strength of the mind, neither lifted up nor 
pressed down with external or casual accidents.’6 
Constancy follows from reason, because it implies proper judgment and 
adequate understanding. It has nothing to do with stubbornness or pride. Lipsius 
describes patience and lowliness of mind as the ‘true mother of Constancy’. No 
one should confuse this with resignation. For Constancy comes from the use of 
reason. Reason knows the difference between the so-called evil and evil, between 
the so-called good and what is truly good, between general calamity and personal 
misery. For those who lament the adversity of their country are often just 
concerned with their own wellbeing. General disaster usually stirs and disturbs 
3 Lagrée (2002).
4 Crouzet (2005). 
5 Justus Lipsius, On Constancy, I, 3. 
6 Justus Lipsius, On Constancy, I, 3.
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people, not because the loss affects the majority, but because they themselves are 
part of that majority. 
Using a military vocabulary, Lipsius explained how a man can come to 
steadfastness. Firstly, he has to comprehend how Providence works. Everyone 
should understand that a great catastrophe is sent by God; is inevitable and 
determined by fate; is useful and is not as serious as one might think. God had 
created the world and everything that happens in the world is necessary, since 
God is Logos, Reason.7 Therefore reality is rational and insightful. It is essential 
then to trust God and to follow nature or Logos.8
In other words, in his neo-stoicism, Lipsius reconciled the Greek Stoa – a 
pagan pantheism, assuming God coincides with nature and with cosmic energy 
– with Christian Providence, thus with a monotheism that believes in a personal 
Divine Providence. Providence is a foreseeing intelligence. In God there is 
a watchful and continual care, whereby God beholds, searches and knows all 
things; and ‘knowing them disposes and orders the same by an immutable course 
unknown to us’.9 
So the wise man looks upon injustice differently; wars are just like natural 
disasters and as the changing tides. They belong to nature, they are as natural as 
the movements of the sun. ‘Everything is constantly changing,’ wrote Montaigne. 
Lipsius confirmed this, and showed how a wise person can take heart from this 
knowledge. A storm passes, and after the storm, quiet returns. But just as well 
no throne remains intact: the so-called ‘Eternal City’ had been buried, burned 
and flooded for centuries.10 The same goes for Byzantium, ‘the proud seat of two 
Empires’. Even Antwerp, ‘the Beauty of cities, in time shall come to nothing’ 
(Ibidem). But this should not be an excuse for cowardice of faintheartedness: ‘if 
it is destiny that this weather-beaten ship of your country shall be saved from 
drowning, it is destiny also that she be aided and defended.’11
Lipsius very much admired Montaigne: ‘the French Thales’. In his turn, Montaigne 
called Lipsius ‘the most learned man left, a polished and judicious mind’ (II, 12, 
652).12 Montaigne and Lipsius had a lot in common: like Montaigne, Lipsius 
sought to answer the questions of his time by reverting to ancient philosophy. 
And like Montaigne, that led him to rediscover Seneca and the Stoics. But they 
handle the stoic heritage very differently. 
7 Bolloré (2011).
8 Justus Lipsius, On Constancy, I, 14. 
9 Justus Lipsius, On Constancy, I, 13.
10 Justus Lipsius, On Constancy, I, 16.
11 Justus Lipsius, On Constancy, I, 22.
12 Magnien (1996).
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Lipsius’s title refers to Seneca’s De Constantia Sapientis, On the Constancy of 
the Wise.13 Steadfastness is the prerogative of the wise person who is immune 
to injustice and insult. He is imperturbable and invulnerable; nothing touches 
his inner life. Nobody, not even the most brutal tyrant, can destroy or hog the 
‘inner citadel’ of his soul. Seneca gave the example of Stilpo who not only lost all 
his possessions after the siege of his city, but also lost his daughters. Answering 
the mean question of Demetrius whether he had lost something, Stilpo said: 
‘Nothing. All my belongings are with me.’14 And that was not a pose. The wise 
man is detached. What really matters is virtue and honesty. 
Seneca used the war rhetoric that Lipsius also applied. But unlike Lipsius, 
Seneca does not refer to Fortuna in this essay, nor did he refer to Destiny of 
Providence. Steadfastness is primarily related to the way the wise man reacts to 
violence or to insult, and to how he assesses a situation. Montaigne agreed with 
this, and therefore he was a more loyal reader of the Stoics than Lipsius: his Essays 
did not address the metaphysical contemplations and the theodicy that made up 
the core of Lipsius’s discourse. 
However, Montaigne reconciled Christianity and the stoic tradition in another 
way. For Seneca, inconstancy seemed like a disease that could be cured. Great 
effort and the right therapy could make the soul stronger. Montaigne’s account 
sounded less promising: ‘we are entirely made of bits and pieces, woven together 
so diversely and shapelessly that each of them pulls its own way at every moment. 
And there is as much difference between us and ourselves as there is between us 
and other people.’ (II, 1, 380) He wrote this in the first edition. In the last edition 
he added a quote from Seneca: ‘Magnam rem puta unum hominem agere’ [Let me 
convince you that it is a hard task to be always the same man]- The distinction is 
minimal. But still: for Seneca, constancy is a challenging task, whereas Montaigne 
deemed it ontologically impossible. Inconstancy is part of the human condition: 
‘Vacillation seems to me to be the most common and blatant defect of our nature’ 
(II, 1, 373). But this does not exempt anyone from the obligation to seek it.
Montaigne and Lipsius were looking for comfort and guidelines and found 
those in the ancient philosophy rather than in a Christian tradition. In his 
library, Montaigne had about 65 inscriptions: some were biblical – e.g. ‘Per 
omnia vanitas’; others were taken from Diogenes Laertius’ book on the lives 
of ancient philosophers, the vast majority referred to ancient philosophy. The 
idea, to surround oneself with adages and aphorisms, belongs to the humanistic 
tradition, advocated by Erasmus. It is a habit in ancient Hellenistic schools. The 
13 Lagrée (1999).
14 Seneca, De Constantia Sapientis, V, 6; Montaigne uses the same example : I, 39, 240; 288.
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followers of Epicurus wore a signet ring with a portrait of Epicurus. The picture 
of Epicurus helped them when they found themselves in a difficult situation. 
Asking, ‘What would Epicurus do?’, encouraged them to act as the master. The 
stoics loved sententiae, short formulas which summarized their whole philosophy. 
‘What is wisdom?’, Seneca asked in his letters to Lucilius. And he gave the 
answer: to always want and always reject the same things.15 This statement 
helps his young interlocutor to organize his own thinking but also to act. For 
Ancient philosophers as for their Renaissance admirers philosophy is much 
more then theoretical considerations for a handful of specialists. To constantly 
have the principles of philosophy in front of him, helps Montaigne to behave 
as a philosopher, i.e. someone who wants his acts to be in accordance with his 
thoughts. Philosophy is not about an absolute and unchangeable truth. The truth 
of philosophy lies in the never-ending effort of the aspirant philosopher. The 
adages and maxims in Montaigne’s library testify to his will to be permanently 
confronted with the shortcomings of his mind, the vanity of human ambitions. 
These proverbs and mottos are very short but extremely powerful lessons: a man 
should know his own limits and act accordingly, and persevere. Hence Montaigne 
reads and studies Seneca. When Seneca is considering ‘constancy’ he uses terms as 
‘solidity’. He thinks of Plutarch and Seneca as ‘solid’ writers (I, 26) and he admits: 
‘like the Danaïdes he is constantly dipping into their books and then pouring 
out’ (I, 26, 164). He also knows he is not as solid and strong as they are: ‘I spill 
some of it on this paper but next to nothing on to me’. Philosophy is a permanent 
battle. 
There was a lot of Seneca on Montaigne’s paper. And many of the chapters of 
the first edition, such as ‘To philosophize is to learn how to die’ (I, 20), seemed 
compilations of excerpts of stoic philosophers. The starting point to chapter 24 
‘Same design: different outcomes’ is Seneca’s essay De Clementia, the constancy 
of the princes capable of governing themselves; the generosity of a powerful man 
who waives the possibility of punishing a wrongdoer.16 Montaigne cited the story 
of the emperor Augustus who commands his opponent Cinna to appear before 
him and confront him with his plans to kill him. Cinna protests and denies 
having had such a wicked thought. But after a long explanation on politics and 
treason Augustus sends Cinna away as a free man: Cinna subsequently became a 
firm friend and the sole heir to all his property (I, 24, 143). Montaigne implicitly 
compared this anecdote with a recent story that he heard form Jacques Amyot.17 
15 Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 20,5. 
16 Seneca, De Clementia, II, 3. 
17 See Schaefer (1990), pp. 263-268 who has pointed to the differences (religious grounds in the case of de 
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It is about the famous nobleman François de Guise, who had been informed 
by the queen-mother that Protestants were preparing an attack against him. 
Like Augustus, de Guise confronted his enemy with these rumours: ‘My lord 
So-and-So, you know well enough what I want you for: your face shows it’ (I, 
24, 141). And like Augustus, de Guise let him go: ‘I would like to show you 
how much milder is the religion I hold than the one you profess’. But there was 
a difference: de Guise was killed anyhow. Montaigne comments: ‘So vain and 
worthless is human wisdom: despite all our projects, counsels and precautions, the 
outcome remains in the possession of Fortune’ (I, 24, 143). That said, although 
Augustus’s (or Seneca’s) prudence did not prevent de Guise death, de Guise will 
be remembered as a decent man. But Montaigne used these stories to underline 
the abomination of the civil wars. He who is condemned to live in permanent 
suspicion cannot protect himself against an old, dutiful friend who has defected 
to the enemy: it is hard ‘to protect oneself from an enemy who (…) holds his own 
life cheap’ (I, 24, 145). Such a man is ‘always master of the life of another man’.18 
To keep calm, to be able to trust, and do well, is a wonderful stoic guideline to 
which Montaigne wants to be loyal. 
Montaigne very much admired the ethos of Seneca. He respected him for his 
constancy and thought he was trustworthy.19 Unlike Cicero who asked of his 
interlocutors and readers courage and constancy which he could not deploy 
himself, Seneca truly inspired his readers and friends: ‘Cicero cannot put heart 
into you; he has none to give. But Seneca rouses you and inflames you’(II, 31, 
811). But surprisingly Montaigne was also inspired by Seneca’s counterpart, the 
sceptic philosopher, Pyrrho: 
The philosopher Pyrrho happened to be aboard ship during a mighty storm; 
to those about him whom he saw most terrified he pointed out an exemplary 
pig, quite unconcerned with the storm; he encouraged to imitate it. Dare we 
conclude that the benefit of reason (which we praise so highly and on account 
of which we esteem ourselves to be lords and masters of all creation) was placed 
in us for our torment? What use is knowledge if, for its sake, we lose the calm 
and repose which we would enjoy without it and it makes our condition worse 
than that of Pyrrho’s pig? Intelligence was given us for our greater good: shall we 
use it to bring about our downfall by fighting against the design of Nature and 
Guise; tactics with Augustus; the irony of Montaigne: de Guise is responsible for the massacre at Wassy, 
etc.) and the « machiavellian » insight of de Montaigne.
18 On the patience and the cold bloodedness of fanatics, see Roose (2016).
19 Montaigne here defends Seneca, who is often accused of hypocrisy, see Wilson (2015). 
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the order of the Universe, which require each creature to use its faculties and 
resources for its advantage? (I, 14, 54; 74)
Montaigne was not so much interested in the differences between Pyrrho of 
Elis, the Stoic Epictetus and Epicurus. Philosophy aims at the same purpose: the 
philosopher wants tranquillity, peace of mind, imperturbability. Therefore the 
aspirant philosopher has to change his life, to convert to a life of true wisdom. 
This conversion, though, should not be a sudden burst of good intentions and 
lofty deeds, because every one is capable of those (II, 29, 705; 829). It is much 
more important how one acts in daily life. A true philosopher tries to live in 
accordance to his teachings. Pyrrho did so in a consistent, almost inhuman way. 
Starting from the basic ignorance of man, everything was indifferent to him. 
Montaigne recounted this anecdote to explain this point: constancy is not a 
virtue, if it is not connected to consistent behaviour. But that behaviour should 
originate from moral insight. The stubbornness with which the French Catholic 
Balthazar Gérard (II, 29, ‘On virtue’) plotted the religious-political murder of 
William of Orange and then underwent his horrible verdict is not a conquest over 
the passions, but a continuation of hatred. For true virtue implies overcoming 
one’s own passions (II, 11), without hope for fame or for profit, without fear or 
habituation (I, 37,). The sect of the Assassins, the Islamic, very pious murderers 
who thought ‘that the surest way to merit paradise is to kill someone of an 
opposing religion’ (II, 29, 806) was not a group of wise stoics. 
Admittedly, the whole ideal had something military to it. Montaigne 
constantly underlined the necessary preparedness to fight every day. Take the 
essay ‘On the armour of the Parthians’. In this short, boring collection of facts, 
Montaigne seemed to regret the receding vigilance of the aristocracy (II, 9, 
454). He referred more often to the decline of the military, virile values that he 
perceived in his time. These remarks undoubtedly had to do with his desire to be 
taken seriously, as a nobleman, an author, a diplomat. Writing and reading did 
not suit his newly acquired noble status, while writing on the military exploits 
and the utility or disadvantage of a harness seemed to fit better.
 
But there is more: the reference to Montaigne’s father changes the gist. Pierre 
de Montaigne fought in Italy, in a regular army, subjected to military discipline, 
against a foreign enemy (hostes). The civil wars Montaigne had to endure were of 
a totally different nature. Frenchmen were fighting a secretive, cruel war against 
other Frenchmen (inimicus), because of religious dogmas. ‘On the armour of the 
Parthians’ outlined the moral, political and societal decay by comparison with 
the ancients. The stories of demanding Roman generals and Spartan soldiers 
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revolve around Montaigne’s obsession with the personal, daily training necessary 
to survive in times of political disarray, moral distress and hardship. 
Civil wars fought for religious faith not only changed the interpretations of 
warfare, but also altered the focus of the struggle. Never wanting to flee their 
responsibilities, Montaigne and Lipsius had to seek new sources of valuable ideas. 
They experienced how civil war made struggle into an internal fight, against a 
different enemy: the opponent belonged to the same country, and followed the 
same traditions. Moreover, this peculiar contest concerned the inner dealings 
with adversity and strife. Montaigne and Lipsius turned to philosophy – and 
ancient philosophy in particular – to find useful suggestions on how to bring 
about constancy. In doing so, they showed the limitations that Christian faith 
had to offer them, although they both – each in their own way – did reconcile 
their philosophical perspectives with the Christian tradition.
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